Principles, Partnerships and Power: António Costa's Vision for Europe's Place in a Multipolar World

Ahead of the G7 summit in France, the European Council President outlines what may become the European Union's defining geopolitical doctrine for the coming decade.

By Spartak Fikaj

BRUSSELS — European leaders have spent much of the last three years responding to crises. Russia's invasion of Ukraine shattered assumptions about peace on the continent. Conflict in the Middle East has fuelled instability far beyond the region itself. Economic competition between the United States and China has intensified. Global supply chains have become increasingly vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. Meanwhile, the institutions of multilateral cooperation that emerged after the Second World War are facing growing strain.

Against this backdrop, European Council President António Costa has begun articulating a broader vision for how the European Union should navigate an international system undergoing profound transformation. In a speech delivered at Sciences Po in Paris ahead of the G7 Summit in Évian, Costa presented what amounts to a strategic framework for Europe's future role in world affairs. It is built around three concepts: principles, partnerships and power.

The choice of language is significant because it reflects a growing recognition in Brussels that the European Union can no longer rely on the assumptions that shaped much of the post-Cold War era. For decades, European integration advanced in a world largely characterised by expanding globalisation, growing economic interdependence and confidence in international institutions. Today, European policymakers increasingly describe a world that is less predictable, more fragmented and more competitive. Costa's speech represents an attempt to define how Europe should respond to this reality.

The starting point of his argument is that the international system is becoming both more multipolar and more unstable. Emerging powers are exercising greater influence, while respect for international law appears increasingly contested. The combination of these two trends is particularly important. Multipolarity itself is not necessarily a threat. Indeed, many countries welcome a world in which power is distributed more broadly. The challenge arises when competition among powers occurs without sufficient respect for common rules. Costa argues that the result is visible across several regions of the world, from Ukraine to Gaza and Sudan, where armed conflict, humanitarian crises and geopolitical rivalry have exposed the limitations of existing international mechanisms.

For the European Union, the response begins with principles. This is perhaps the least surprising element of Costa's framework, yet it remains fundamental to understanding how Brussels sees itself. Throughout the speech, he repeatedly returns to the defence of international law, multilateral cooperation and rules-based governance. Critics often dismiss such language as idealistic. However, from the European perspective, these principles are not simply moral preferences. They are strategic necessities. The European Union's prosperity depends on open trade, stable markets and predictable international behaviour. A world governed primarily by military power and spheres of influence would place Europe at a significant disadvantage. For Brussels, defending international law is therefore not only an ethical commitment but a practical expression of self-interest.

Costa's discussion of Ukraine illustrates this logic. The European Union's support for Kyiv is often portrayed as a response to Russian aggression alone. Yet in his speech, the conflict is framed in much broader terms. The issue is not simply the future of Ukraine but the future of the international system itself. If borders can be altered through force without consequence, the principles underpinning international stability become significantly weaker. The same reasoning informs European concern regarding developments in the Middle East. Although the circumstances differ, the underlying principle remains consistent: international order depends upon the application of common rules.

Yet Costa also acknowledges a reality that many European policymakers have increasingly recognised. Principles alone are insufficient. Values may define objectives, but they do not automatically generate influence. This leads to the second pillar of his framework: partnerships.

The emphasis on partnerships reflects one of the most notable shifts in European foreign policy over recent years. The European Union has traditionally exercised influence through economic integration, regulatory standards and diplomatic engagement rather than military power. As geopolitical competition intensifies, Brussels has responded by expanding and deepening relationships with countries that share at least some of its strategic interests. Costa argues that the European Union's greatest strength lies not in coercion but in attraction. Europe remains one of the world's largest markets, one of its leading trading powers and one of its most significant sources of investment and development assistance. These assets allow it to build networks of cooperation rather than spheres of influence.

The examples he cites are revealing. Agreements with Mercosur and India are presented not merely as trade deals but as components of a broader strategy to strengthen international cooperation. Collectively, these agreements cover more than two billion people and illustrate the scale of Europe's ambitions. The objective is not only economic growth but the creation of a wider coalition of countries committed to openness, multilateralism and rules-based cooperation. In Costa's vision, partnerships become instruments through which Europe helps shape the emerging international order.

This emphasis on partnerships also reflects changing attitudes toward global governance. Rather than viewing international politics through the lens of competition between a small number of superpowers, Costa presents a world in which middle powers are becoming increasingly important. Many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America do not wish to choose between rival blocs. Instead, they seek diversified relationships that maximise strategic autonomy. Europe believes it can become a preferred partner for many of these countries because it offers cooperation without demanding exclusive allegiance.

The third pillar of Costa's framework may be the most important. Principles and partnerships, he argues, require power to be effective. Here the language becomes noticeably more direct. European leaders have become increasingly aware that economic strength and security capabilities are essential if Europe wishes to influence international developments rather than simply react to them.

Costa identifies competitiveness and defence as the two foundations of European power. This reflects a major shift in Brussels. Economic policy, industrial policy, technological innovation and defence spending are no longer treated as separate policy domains. They are increasingly viewed as interconnected elements of strategic autonomy. Without a competitive economy, Europe cannot finance its ambitions. Without credible defence capabilities, it cannot guarantee its security. Without both, its ability to promote multilateralism and international law becomes significantly constrained.

This argument has become particularly influential following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The conflict exposed weaknesses in European defence readiness and highlighted dependencies in areas ranging from energy to critical technologies. At the same time, growing competition in artificial intelligence, semiconductors and advanced manufacturing has intensified concerns regarding Europe's long-term competitiveness. Costa's call for stronger economic and military foundations reflects these concerns.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the speech is its rejection of a world divided into spheres of influence. Costa repeatedly argues that global challenges cannot be solved by one power acting alone or by two powers dividing the world between them. This is a direct challenge to narratives that frame international politics primarily as a contest between Washington and Beijing. Instead, he envisions a multipolar system in which coalitions, partnerships and international institutions play a central role.

Whether such a vision proves achievable remains uncertain. The international environment is becoming increasingly competitive, and many observers question whether multilateral institutions can adapt quickly enough to emerging challenges. Yet Costa's remarks provide valuable insight into how Europe's leadership views the world. They suggest that the European Union does not intend to retreat into isolation, nor does it wish to become merely a junior partner in the strategies of larger powers.

As leaders gather in Évian for the G7 Summit, Costa's message is clear. Europe believes that the era of passive reliance on global stability is over. The European Union intends to defend its interests, strengthen its partnerships and increase its strategic capabilities. But unlike many other powers, it intends to do so while continuing to argue that international cooperation, rather than confrontation, remains the most effective path toward global stability.

In an age increasingly defined by geopolitical rivalry, that may be the most ambitious element of Europe's strategy. The European Union is attempting not merely to adapt to a changing world, but to shape the rules by which that world operates. Whether it possesses sufficient power to do so will be one of the defining questions of the coming decade.